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Abstract
This paper presents initial findings on the economic impact of the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) based on a sample of Chicago area households that filed tax returns in the spring
of 1998.  Respondents reported on their detailed use of the funds to pay bills, purchase new
items, or save. Asset information on the households was also gathered, along with questions
regarding the ability of households to make particular expenditures without the help of the EITC.
Uses of the EITC are divided into those that improve social mobility (e.g., purchase a car, pay
tuition, change housing) and those that primarily help to make ends meet (e.g., pay routine bills,
purchase food) and determinants of each are explored in a regression framework.  The paper also
explores the relationship among the financial system, asset and borrowing status, and EITC
usage.  Implications for tax policy and social policy are drawn in conclusion.  As far as we know,
this is the first research to address these issues, despite the fact that, excluding programs for the
elderly and Medicaid, the EITC is our largest federal entitlement program.
Introduction
The largest United States cash income support program for low-income families is the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).  Last year (1998), the EITC was expected to cost the federal
government $30.5 billion according to the Council of Economic Advisers (1998).1  More than
19.7 million taxpaying units benefited from the EITC in 1998, with roughly 80 percent of the
benefits returned to claimants in the form of an IRS tax refund check.  Though we do not study
state EITCs here since Illinois (the sample site) does not have a state EITC program, 11 states
currently have their own Earned Credit Income program (Johnson and Lazere 1999).  These
state-level tax instruments supplement the federal EITC, adding to both the impact and the total
outlays for the EITC (Greenstein and Shapiro 1998).
Despite its enormity, very little is known about the impact of the EITC on the families
who receive it.  Unlike other income-transfer programs, the EITC is received by almost all
families as an annual, lump-sum, tax refund check paid sometime in the spring of the year after
earnings are received.  Moreover, the EITC is administered by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) via the personal income tax system, thus permitting eligible clients to self-select for
benefits without a formal review and certification of eligibility criteria (Liebman 1998a).
Because of the form and generosity of the EITC, it is liable to have very different effects than if
the benefit were received on a monthly basis over the year in which countable income was
earned, or were the system administered by Food Stamps or Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) authorities.  As a result, the EITC offers an opportunity to observe behavioral
response to a lump-sum transfer.
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Are EITC checks used to pay bills or to make new purchases, or are they primarily saved
or invested?  Does the EITC mainly help finance current consumption, or does it affect savings
and investment behavior, helping low-income beneficiaries build assets and equity and therefore
improve social mobility?  The purpose of this paper is to provide some answers to these
questions.
Several recent authors have explored various aspects of the EITC, and these are reviewed
in Section II along with a discussion of the economic and behavioral effects of the EITC.  We
then present our study: how the data were collected and the sample examined, classification of
“use bundles” for this paper, and amounts and composition of tax refunds received (Section III).
Next, in Section IV, we present our results.  Finally, we discuss these results, their implications
for tax policy and social policy, and other issues to be explored in future studies.
The EITC:  Background Recent Studies and Economic Effects
Program Basics and Earlier Studies of Behavioral Effects and Antipoverty
Impacts
The EITC was enacted in 1975 to provide refundable tax credits to low-income workers,
and originally to refund some fraction of their Social Security taxes (Eissa and Hoynes 1998).  It
was significantly expanded in the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 and the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Acts (OBRA) of 1990, and particularly in 1993, such that by 1999 a maximum
federal refundable tax credit of $3,816 was available to low income households with two
children and earned income between $9,540 and $12,460 (Table 1).2  Various estimates of the
cost of the EITC made for 1998 run from $27.7 billion to $30.5 billion compared to $5.9 billion
just ten years earlier (Table 2).  Participation rates in the EITC have been estimated in the 85
3
percent range for 1990 (Scholz 1994), but may have changed since then as the generosity of the
program has increased and eligibility rules have changed.3  Participation rates in other means-
tested programs are well below the 80 percent level.  For instance, 1987 participation rates in the
former Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program were 62 to 72 percent, and in
the Food Stamp program 54 to 66 percent (Blank and Ruggles 1996).
While the details of the EITC have changed somewhat over the past decade, the most
significant changes have taken place in benefit generosity to families with two children.  The
1993 OBRA, expanded the maximum credit for families with two children from $1,511 in 1993
to $3,816 in 1999, and higher in subsequent years (see Figure 1 and Table 1).  The result is a 40
percent earnings subsidy for low earnings families in 1999 compared to a 19.5 percent subsidy in
1993.  The EITC now helps families with two children and incomes of up to $30,585 compared
to $23,050 in 1993 (Figure 1).  Because of this growth, the EITC benefits a wide range of
families from those who might be cycling on and off welfare (TANF) to those with near median
incomes.  Faced with this broad range of beneficiaries, we would expect to find different types of
effects for different types of recipients.  Indeed this is the case.
Among lower income families, EITC is not counted as TANF income in most states
(Meyer and Rosenbaum 1998), nor is it counted toward Food Stamps or Medicaid eligibility in
the month that it is received.4  The EITC therefore offers a powerful work incentive for low-
income earners with children, e.g., the TANF population.  And low-income earners in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin involved in the New Hope Experiment seem to understand the
relationship between work and the size of the tax refund as being linear, i.e., “more work, more
money” (Romich and Weisner 1999)  One recent econometric study (Meyer and Rosenbaum
1998) concludes that the EITC has been the foremost driving force in explaining increased hours
worked by former welfare mothers over the 1993-1996 period.  Eissa and Liebman (1996) reach
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a similar conclusion using different data, and the Council of Economic Advisors (1998, Chart 6)
demonstrates that increased labor force participation among low-income mothers closely tracks
changes in the maximum EITC benefit level over the past decade.  While other TANF changes—
the enhancement of earnings disregards, sanctions and limits on benefit receipt—and a strong
growing economy with low unemployment also helped put more welfare mothers to work, there
is little doubt that the EITC played a large role in reducing the welfare rolls (see also Council of
Economic Advisers 1998; Blank, Card, and Robbins 1998).
Of course, as with all targeted income supplement programs, what goes up with rising
earnings (benefits) must at some point decline (phase out).  The federal EITC for families with
two or more children in 1999 declines at a rate of 21.06 percent per dollar earned from $12,460
to $30,580 (Figure 1).  While there have been no studies of the effect of the phase out on single
earners, Eissa and Hoynes (1998) find that the phase out reduces work effort by married women
by a noticeable amount.  Thus, higher earning families in the “phase-out” region of the EITC
respond differently than do lower earnings units in the “phase-in” or “plateau” ranges (see
Figure 1).
Other recent research (Dickert-Conlin and Houser 1998) suggests that the EITC has
ambiguous effects on the decision to be a female head or to marry.  Dickert-Conlin and Holtz-
Eakin (1998) compare the EITC to employer-based wage subsidies and find that the EITC has
high participation rates and produces increased labor force participation among groups at risk of
long-run labor force detachment.  Blank (1998) also finds the EITC is better targeted on low-
income families than equivalent cost employer-based wage or earnings subsidies..
The EITC also has a powerful anti-poverty effect, reducing child poverty by 2.4 million in
1996, or a one-seventh reduction in poor children.  It is the largest single program removing
children from poverty (Greenstein and Shapiro 1998).  According to the Census Bureau, the
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EITC removed 4.3 million persons of all ages from poverty in 1997, more than double the 1993
amount (Council of Economic Advisers 1998).  Among the working poor, some 30 percent of
children who would otherwise be poor (based on earnings and other sources of income) were
lifted from poverty by the EITC.  And by itself, the EITC offsets between one-fourth and one-
third of the declining share of national income received by the poorest fifth of all households
with children from 1976 to 1996 (Liebman 1998).
In sum, recent studies have shown that the EITC increases work effort of low-income
families by supplementing earnings, thus raising net incomes and reducing poverty.  But these
studies treat the EITC as an income subsidy and for the most part ignore its delivery mechanism
and form of benefit receipt.
Economic and Behavioral Effects
Because of its unique administration and “lumpy” character, the EITC offers a rare
opportunity to examine the economic impact of the program on recipients.5  The lumpy nature of
the EITC arises from several forces.  First of all the EITC can be taken as a transfer during the
year.  If employees fill in a W-5 withholding form submit it to their employers they can receive
up to 60 percent of the maximum allowable amount of the EITC scaled to their monthly or
weekly checks.  The maximum amount of refunds in 1998 was $26 per week (O’Connor 1999a).
However, over 95 percent of recipients do not use this option, and instead receive a lump sum
amount when they file their income tax in the following year (Scholz 1994).  There are several
possible explanations for such behavior, including: (a) employers’ unwillingness to participate in
the program; (b) employees’ unwillingness to inform the employer due to stigma effects or fears
of lower pre-tax wages, and (c) employees’ desire for the forced savings aspects of the EITC.
There is some evidence that recipients prefer the forced savings aspects of the EITC (Romich and
Weisner 1999; Olson and Davis 1994).  However, the relative impacts of these factors, and
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perhaps others, have yet to be examined, and our study sheds little or no light on the question of
why clients receive EITC benefits in the current form.
Regardless of the reason for type of benefit receipt, the lumpy nature of the EITC benefit
and its recent rapid increases in benefit generosity create a rare and different opportunity to study
the effects of the program on household finances—both on expenditure patterns and on asset
behavior (i.e., debt, credit, and savings).6  In fact, very little has been written on the effects of the
EITC on household financial behavior or on the way that households use EITC benefits, despite
the fact that benefits received can be as high as 50 percent of the previous year’s income, for
example, in states like Wisconsin with high state supplements (Deparle 1999).
Small studies (200- to 300-person telephone interviews) have shown that the EITC is
used to pay overdue utility bills (e.g., Gallup Poll 1993), but, to our knowledge, not much else
has been written on this topic.  One important New York Times news story (Rimer 1995)
suggested that some recipients made interesting and creative use of the EITC to improve
transportation to and from a job, to move to a safer neighborhood, or to put children into better
schools.  However, the extent to which these uses are typical or idiosyncratic was not examined
by Rimer.  A recent ethnographic study of 42 low-income families in Wisconsin examines the
use of tax refunds (Romich and Weisner 1999).7  The authors conclude that families use lump-
sum tax refunds to improve family well-being and to make large purchases.  Throughout the year
low-income families in the Romich and Weisner study seem to alter their market and nonmarket
labor supply in order to help smooth the flow of economic resources.
We do know something about the households that the EITC serves.  National samples of
EITC beneficiaries include two major groups:  (a) about 70 percent are single parents, many of
whom are just cycling off of welfare or are filing single-person returns; (b) almost 30 percent are
low earning two-parent households (U.S. Congress 1998, Table 13-13, p. 871).  Almost half (47
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percent) of single-parent recipients were in the phase-in or flat region of the EITC in 1994 (Eissa
and Hoynes 1998; U.S. General Accounting Office 1996), with the rest in the phase-out region.
Most of these recipients file taxes as heads of households.  Two-parent families are less likely to
be in the phase-in or flat portions (about 27 percent).  Both groups of filers are included in our
study.
The CLHS Study:  Data Classifications of Use and Composition of Tax
Refunds
Our data are drawn from a sample of 7,000 low-income Chicago area taxpayers who
utilized the free tax preparation services provided by the Center for Law and Human Services
(CLHS) in the winter and spring of 1998.  The CLHS has ten centers in the Chicago metropolitan
area in which any low-income taxpayer can receive free assistance from professionally qualified
volunteers in preparing their tax return.  We designed the survey instrument and employed five
interviewers who visited seven of these sites from January 1998 through April 1998 to interview
taxpayers in general, and EITC beneficiaries in particular.  More than 90 percent of taxpayers
interviewed were willing to discuss their refunds.  This produced a sample of 1,226 total
interviews, 1,121 of whom expected to receive a federal refund and 846 of whom expected to
benefit from the EITC.  From these we selected a smaller sample of 826 whom CLHS calculated
would receive both a federal tax refund and the EITC as part of that refund.  These 826 the
analysis below.  About one-quarter (208) of these families also completed a follow-up phone
interview six weeks after filing to verify their receipt of the EITC and to answer again the same
questions posed to them earlier on their use of the EITC.8
The CLHS database contains two types of information.  First, we have access to the
federal tax returns of all recipients who filed through CLHS in 1998.  For our sample this
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includes filing status, number of dependents, and all sources of income reported to the IRS.  In
addition, we constructed an interview about the intended use of the EITC.  The CLHS interview
asked recipients about their knowledge of and expectation of the EITC, and their priorities and
usage of the EITC to pay bills (several categories), purchase items (several categories), or to save
the EITC checks for future use.  Respondents were also queried about their asset holdings, the
effect of the EITC on their degree of work effort, and their ability to carry out their
spending/saving priorities were it not for the EITC.
While the CLHS offers one venue for data collection of this type, it is not the only such
venue or vendor.  Two types of paid tax preparers also help EITC recipients, 65 percent of whom
used tax preparer services in 1990 (Scholz 1994).  One type are large, national, for-profit tax
preparation services such as H&R Block.  Another type are small, informal temporary services
which are provided by self-employed persons. Both types differ from the CLHS in that they
charge fees for tax preparation services while the CLHS does not.  A second difference is that at
least some of these services also charge customers for the right to receive their refunds in
advance of the federal returns (which usually take four to six weeks to be processed).  The CLHS
does not provide this service.  To the extent that clients differ by preparer type, our sample may
be biased away from those with higher personal discount rates, and therefore perhaps away from
those with greater immediate need for the EITC refund.  And we obviously do not include those
who file without a formal tax preparer’s assistance.  Little, if anything, is know about this group.
Sample Characteristics
Our sample is just less than half African American, 30 percent Latino/Hispanic, and 20
percent Caucasian or other.  About 63 percent of our sample are single parents (as determined by
head of household filing status) while 15 percent were married filing a joint return and 22 percent
were single-person filers. 9  Two-thirds of our filers were female, and 56.6 percent of the sample
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received TANF or Food Stamps in 1997 or 1998 (Table A-1).  These characteristics suggest that
our sample population is slightly more likely to be made up of single parents and minorities than
is the national sample described above.  Given the characteristics of the Chicago Metropolitan
area, this is not a surprising finding.
Classification of Expenditure/Savings Bundles
The purpose of this study is to assess two important types of usage for the EITC:
• Making ends meet
• Improving social mobility
The survey instrument we administer permits us to go into considerable detail on classification of
EITC uses.  Respondents were given several categories of future purchases for goods or services,
for paying off existing bills, or for saving the refund for future anticipated or unanticipated needs.
While several other bundles of categories of uses could be created, we initially selected these two
particular categories for several reasons.
Making Ends Meet.     First of all, the EITC is targeted on low-income working
families with children, with more than one-half of those in our sample receiving one or more
means-tested transfers in 1997-98.  Our data suggest that our head of household population is
largely made up of former welfare mothers who in 1998 found formal jobs, or increased hours
worked at existing jobs, and are in effect, trying to make ends meet.  These mothers, most of
whom were much less attached to the labor force in earlier times, may have unmet consumption
needs or may use the EITC mainly to spread their consumption over the year.  We hypothesize
that lowest income EITC recipients, those with considerable welfare attachment, look very much
like 1988-1992 era welfare populations (in Chicago; Charleston, South Carolina; Camden, New
Jersey; San Antonio, Texas; and Boston, Massachusetts) studied by Kathryn Edin (Edin and Lein
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1997).  Edin’s later and ongoing work, which includes a sample of both mothers and absent
fathers in Philadelphia and Camden, New Jersey reports similar findings (Edin 1998).
These studies show that typical household expenses make up over 100 percent of welfare
clients’ incomes, the rest being made up from borrowing or from unreported earnings (Edin and
Lein 1997).  Among these types of households, Edin and Lein have shown that the move from
informal unreported work to formal work adds to expenses (e.g., child care, transportation)
helping reduce or negate the positive impact of higher earned income and after leaving the
household in no better economic circumstances than when they were on welfare.  More recently,
Loprest (1999) reports similar findings.  Partially in response to these findings, most states have
tried to provide a number of subsidies under TANF to help reduce the costs of working,
including a higher earned income disregard for TANF benefits, child care and transportation
subsidies.  Among welfare mothers, Edin found that living day-to-day (or month-to-month) was
the typical way of life and that formal assets, savings or even formal contact with financial
institutions (e.g., banks or use of credit cards) was a rare event.  Despite their poor economic
circumstances, Edin found that many interviewees were aware of and interested in accumulating
assets or using earned income to improve their social mobility (Edin 1998).  Yet the majority
were struggling just to make ends meet (see also Loprest 1999).  Among such types of potential
recipients, the EITC could be seen as a way to buy durables, pay off outstanding bills, and meet
other urgent consumption needs.
A minority of the sample of EITC beneficiaries whom we interviewed are likely to be in
many ways similar to Edin’s sample.  But a larger portion, perhaps a majority, are quite different.
Edin’s samples existed largely on welfare benefits and on informal earnings.  By definition,
EITC clients must have positive formal earnings to be able to claim the EITC.  While we expect
our EITC sample to be better off economically than Edin’s sample in terms of gross income, we
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also expect that the preponderance of single parents in our sample and the high fraction with
prior welfare receipt suggest that many of our clients were similar to Edin’s clients.
Nevertheless, we suspect that just making ends meet is one important use of the EITC which we
need to investigate.  To the extent that the EITC helps meet current consumption needs, it may be
no different than other types of income subsidies, child care subsidies, and similar benefits (e.g.,
Food Stamps) in terms of its impact on EITC recipients.
Improving Social Mobility.     While the large majority of Edin’s sample were credit
constrained and had little leverage to borrow money, many still expressed a strong interest in
having access to credit (Edin 1998).  Many of these clients, however, also realized that saving
EITC benefits in formal settings such as bank accounts would negatively affect their eligibility
for welfare benefits.  Because of these factors, many low-income families may be “credit
constrained” in that they either lack access to formal credit markets or, having access, they are
not credit-worthy enough to obtain a bank loan.  For populations similar to these, and in
particular among those who are struggling to move from welfare to something better, the EITC
and its lumpiness presents an opportunity to make extraordinary types of purchases or expenses
which they might not otherwise be able to make.
The recent literature on assets and the poor (e.g., Sherraden 1991; Bird et al. 1998; Edin
1998; Oliver and Shapiro 1995; Shapiro 1998) suggests that even low-income families are
willing to make sacrifices by postponing current consumption to improve their long-run
economic well-being when presented with appropriate incentives or opportunities to save.
Because of its large size relative to current income, the EITC presents an opportunity for
otherwise credit constrained low-income families to move beyond current consumption and to
use the EITC for asset building purposes.  Shapiro (1998) refers to this as “asset building” or
“improving social mobility.”  We adopt the latter term here to describe several types of equity
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enhancing uses of the EITC for improving longer term economic mobility and well-being.  Many
of these uses are consistent with both Edin’s (1998) findings and with those found by Rimer
(1995)and Romich and Weisner (1999) in their more limited set of interviews.
Moving and Housing.     For instance, recent studies indicate that significant numbers of
low-income central city residents would move to safer neighborhoods if they could afford to do
so (e.g., Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirschfield 1998).  Recent studies based on the Moving to
Opportunity (MTO) experiment verify that low-income central city residents who participate in
MTO overwhelmingly (70 to 75 percent of movers) choose to move away from violence and
crime when given the chance (Ludwig, Duncan, Hirschfield 1998).  Chicago has a number of
dangerous inner city neighborhoods, including those in which we sampled our interviewees (e.g.,
Sampson, Randenbusch, and Earls 1998).  Because moving a household requires both direct
moving expenses and establishment of credibility to pay rent (e.g., first and last months rent), the
EITC might provide such an opportunity.  Alternatively, residents who have a growing stake in
their neighborhood could use the EITC to repair or improve their home.  In fact, 6 percent of our
sample were homeowners who were paying off mortgages, and many of them claimed this as a
priority use of the EITC.
Automobiles and Transportation.     Increasingly, studies of welfare to work are finding
that owning or having access to a reliable means of transportation is a key to reducing the time
costs of work-related travel, and thus enabling a job seeker to expand the area of job search to
obtain higher wages and improved economic well-being.  The EITC also provides an opportunity
to purchase, upgrade, or repair a car, or to make a downpayment on a better car, or to pay for car
insurance.  Since lack of transportation is a serious impediment to job search, employment, and
job mobility, the EITC may provide a critical bridge to a higher level of economic well-being via
a dependable source of transportation (Ong 1996).  Danziger et al. (1998) find that 47 percent of
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their sample of low-income welfare recipients do not own or have access to a car, but for those
who do have a car, the marginal effects of car ownership on earnings are equivalent to the
marginal effects of completing high school in terms of higher future earnings.  Edin (1998) also
reports that her sample of fathers could use cars to begin self-employment as informal taxi
drivers, as pickup and delivery agents, or as “junkers.”10  Hence, an opportunity to purchase a car
or a truck, insure a car, repair a car, or pay off a car loan increases the opportunity to work more
and at better paying jobs   Having a car also significantly reduces the time cost of working for
single mothers who must also arrange child care, physician visits, and other necessities for their
children, thus increasing their attachment to the labor market and providing them with additional
time for childrearing, education, or leisure consumption.
Human Capital.     The EITC also presents a source of funds for human capital
investment both for tuition and as an alternative to student loans or to pay off former student
loans, either for the recipient or their children.11  In effect, a $1,000 to $2,000 EITC is a good
substitute for tuition voucher to a parochial or private school in communities where public
schools are inadequate.  Recipients can also use EITC benefits to improve their children’s early
learning by improving the quality of their child care or for other for child-related learning
enhancing expenses.  The EITC can also pay the recipients tuition at local community colleges or
trade schools.
Saving.     Another important use of the EITC which improves social mobility is either
for saving or paying off extraordinary outstanding bills.  Movement from welfare or government
safety nets to self-protection via own precautionary savings is an important indicator of upward
social mobility.  Making regular car payments and paying off bank loans, medical bills, or credit
card bills are all uses of EITC that help establish or improve a credit history.  Repaying informal
loans or sharing EITC refunds with family members is also indicative of social capital building
14
and maintenance of nongovernmental means of support in case of emergencies.  In fact, a large
majority of American policymakers feel that saving is a worthy activity that should be subsidized
for low-income Americans in the same way that tax deductions for IRAs, 401(k)s, and pensions
subsidize saving for others (Boshara 1999; Seidman 1998).  If the EITC effectively subsidizes
saving as well as work, it has a double benefit for society.
Classifications of Bundles.     We separated our EITC categories of use into two
corresponding “bundles.”  In our sample, payment of regular bills (rent, utilities, food, groceries,
clothing, personal expenses), and purchases of clothing were classified as expenses for making
ends meet.  So were purchases of household appliances or household furniture, as well as other
personal or regular household expenses.
Using of the EITC to improve social mobility included all forms of debt repayment,
savings, and other expenditures which were easily identified as increasing chances for improved
mobility, including all forms of work-related expenses.12  These included payment of credit card,
automobile, or personal debt.  They also included human capital building (e.g., tuition payments,
medical bills), expenses for cars (purchases, repairs, insurance), moving expenses, and home
improvements.  Sharing money with family members was also classified as an equity expense in
that it built social capital.  The complete bundles are listed in Table A-2.
Considerable time and effort were spent to reduce arbitrariness when putting these
selections into bundles. Some amounts of EITC savings will no doubt be used to help make ends
meet in coming months and hence may be misclassified.  But even then, EITC savings become a
form of self-protection and may replace reliance on welfare to meet these expenses.  Similarly,
sharing benefits with extended family might be construed as continued reliance on traditional
networks of support, and not on improved social mobility.  In these cases we may overestimate
items relegated to this category. In contrast, purchases of household appliances and other
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durables among low-income families, which are treated as making ends meet, often produce the
physical capital necessary to start small businesses (Edin 1998).  In this case durable purchases
classified as making ends meet are actually improving social mobility by providing opportunities
for self-employment.  However, these particularly controversial uses were not critical to the
overall patterns that emerged from the analyses that follow. 13
Tax Refunds or EITC?
Because our recipients could receive tax refunds other than the federal EITC due to over-
withholding, it could be that overwithholding, not the EITC itself, is the driving factor in making
these expenditure decisions.  Table 3 presents information on the distribution of total refunds as
well as the EITC per se.  We present data for three groups:  all CLHS tax interviews, all those
getting a refund, and our sample (all of those getting both a positive refund and the EITC).  The
EITC clearly is the largest source of refund for all recipients, particularly those with larger
refunds (Panels B and C of Table 3).14  In our sample, the average EITC payment was $1,497,
which constitutes 85 percent of the average total tax refund.  Above the median tax refund
($1,715 or more in our sample) the EITC was 87.9 percent or more of the total amount received.
Even at the 25th percentile, the EITC was about 70 percent of the $603 total refund received.
Hence, even if we cannot separate use of the EITC per se from other withholding, the EITC is the
main driving force in our analyses and the major source of the associated economic impacts
which we examine below.
Results
Here we report both the descriptive data on uses of the EITC and a set of initial regression
results.  The next section of the paper discusses the findings more generally and their policy
implications.  We begin with two pieces of information:  knowledge of the EITC and its
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importance in helping meet the priorities of the household.  Because of wide differences in
income levels and economic circumstances of EITC households, we also classify respondents
according to one of the three ranges of EITC benefit receipt: those with lower earnings that
provide less than the maximum benefit are in the phase-in (or subsidy) range; those receiving the
maximum are at the plateau level of benefits; and those with higher incomes whose EITC benefit
is reduced for each added dollar of earnings in the “phase out” range (e.g., see Figure 1).  Other
studies have shown that these ranges have different effects on labor supply and other behaviors.
It makes sense that they also might have different effects on uses of the EITC and other variables
of interest.15
Knowledge of the EITC
To some extent, the findings of this study are dependent on the belief that our clients
expected to receive a refund and then considered how those refunds would be used.  In fact, we
found a surprisingly high level of both expectation of a tax refund and knowledge that the EITC
program was the source of the tax refund (Figure 2).  Almost 80 percent of our sample expected
to receive a refund when they came to the CLHS (left side, Figure 2).  Among those expecting a
refund, about one-half seemed to be familiar with the EITC itself (right side, Figure 2).  That is,
they used the term “EITC” for the refund or told the interviewer that the refund was “due to low
income” or because they “worked all year and have a qualifying child,” or a similar response (47
percent of those expecting a refund).  The remaining responses scattered among other categories,
particularly “received a refund last year.”16  We conclude that there is a large and growing
recognition of the program and its potential payoff for working households.  Finally, Panel II of
Table 4 indicates that the expectation of a refund rises across the EITC range, with the highest
expectation at the plateau level where the level of refund is the highest both in dollar terms and
as a percentage of income.  As benefit generosity has grown, so too has knowledge of the EITC.
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The large majority of recipients in our sample therefore anticipate the EITC benefit and are thus
able to factor it into their household financial planning.
Importance of the EITC
Respondents were asked to prioritize up to three important uses of the EITC.  They were
then asked if they could afford to carry out their first priority in the absence of the tax refund.
Almost half of the respondents (46.5 percent) said that they could not meet their first priority
unless they received the EITC, with another 43.4 percent arguing that without the EITC they
would be forced to spend (or save) a lesser amount or to delay their top priority for some time.
While those with the lowest incomes (in the phase-in region) were slightly more likely to have
difficulty, the inability to carry out first priority objectives in the absence of the EITC was
evident across all three EITC ranges.  Only 8 percent could definitely achieve their primary
objective if they did not receive the EITC, and the ability to find alternative sources of income
for the stated purpose increased with higher incomes across the EITC ranges.17   These results
imply that the large majority of beneficiaries could not meet their priority uses unless they
received the EITC.
Priority Uses of the EITC
Respondents were asked to list up to three priority uses of the EITC benefit.  Of our 826
respondents, 617 or 74.7 percent had at least one top priority use for the EITC, while 40 percent
also had a second priority and 12 percent a third priority use as well.  These priorities are
summarized in Figure 3.  They indicate that bill paying was the single most important use of the
EITC for almost one-half of all beneficiaries, with purchases coming in second across all priority
levels.  Across all three priority levels, between 75 and 80 percent of respondents would use the
EITC to pay a bill or make a purchase of some commodity.  Clearly the EITC helps make ends
meet; this result was fully expected.
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However, almost one-half of all respondents (49 percent) also stated that they would save
some or all of their EITC check.  Above we identified three key uses of the EITC to enhance
social mobility:  moving, paying tuition, or purchasing or repairing a car.  Each of these uses is
also summarized in Figure 3.  While moving seems to be an all-or-nothing decision (with only 3
percent listing it as a secondary or tertiary preference compared to 4 percent who list it as a
primary preference), paying tuition or purchasing/repairing a car are more evenly spread across
the preference scale.  Altogether, 16 percent of the sample stated they would use the EITC to pay
tuition while 22 percent would make a car-related use of the refund.  These uses suggest that the
EITC also plays a large role in improving social mobility, a finding that we did not expect.  All
other priority uses of the EITC are summarized in the final columns and amount to only 11
percent of primary priorities and 14 percent of secondary priorities.  The separately identified
categories therefore seem to be driving our results.  We therefore concentrate on these specific
uses.
Bundles of Use
If we combine priority uses across all respondents so that all persons stating each use (i.e.,
as a first, second, or third priority) are represented and bundle them as suggested in the previous
section of the paper, we arrive at our best overall snapshot of EITC use (Table 5).18  Several
important patterns are evident in this table.
• More than one-half of all beneficiaries had a social mobility related use for the
EITC.  This use increased with income and benefit level, peaking for those with the
maximum benefit (Panel B).  Moving, transportation, and saving all peaked in the
plateau range and declined slightly in the phase out range.  Tuition expenses increased
slightly as incomes rose.
• Making ends meet was an important use of the EITC for almost one-half of the
sample (Panel C).  Utilities and rent were higher priorities than were food and clothes.
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• As expected, the lowest income households in the phase-in range had higher
immediate needs than did those in the phase-out range.  Utilities and rent dominated
food and clothes as consumption needs for this group.
• Less than 20 percent of the sample had no plans for the EITC, with those in the phase-
in range most likely to not state a use (Panel D).  Both our data and anecdotal
evidence (DeParle 1999) suggests that these were likely to be lower income persons
who did not expect a refund to begin with.
• If we were to prioritize usage according to our designated bundles of uses, we find
that while those who would make both types of use are evenly spread across the range
of refunds at 21 to 23 percent of respondents, about one-third would make social
mobility uses only while one-quarter would use the EITC check only to make ends
meet.  Both bundles follow predictable patterns across the EITC range with those in
the phase-in region having making ends meet as the highest priority while those at the
plateau or in the phase-out ranges seem to place a higher priority on uses that improve
longer run social mobility.
Thus, there are some suggestions that the determinants of EITC usage vary in predictable ways.
Before turning to the regression results, one additional piece of background information need be
examined, differences in EITC related to access to formal financial credit among the beneficiary
population.
Access to Credit
It is important to understand how EITC recipients relate to financial institutions.  The
ability to safely protect assets until they are needed seems important to long-term mobility.  Low-
income respondents who use check cashing services and who have no formal relationship to
financial markets, e.g., no checking or savings accounts, and no credit cards, loans, or mortgages,
are less likely to be able to keep a large EITC refund intact for future needs.
In fact, access to financial and credit markets differs markedly across the ranges of
benefits.  Only 40 percent of those in the phase-in range had one or more of the types of financial
affiliations listed above.  Only 24 percent had a checking account.  In contrast, almost 73 percent
of those in the phase-out region had some contact with financial markets.  Checking and savings
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accounts, credit card usage and bank loans all increase across the EITC range.  In contrast, use of
a check cashing service declined steadily across the income ranges, with 57.8 percent of those in
the phase-in range using such services, and 44.3 percent of the plateau group.  Many of our
respondents did, however, indicate that they wanted to open a checking or savings account with
their EITC check once they received it.  Preliminary comparisons indicate that these breakdowns
are similar to those found by other researchers using national samples to investigate use of credit
cards and checking and savings accounts among low-income populations (e.g., Bird et al. 1998;
Carney and Gale 1998).
Summary of Descriptive Tabular Data
Altogether, these tabulations indicate that knowledge of EITC is high, that the large
majority of people who receive the EITC expect it, and that most of those people have at least
one use related to building social mobility for the EITC.  Yet many recipients have little or no
formal ties to financial markets and many rely on informal services to cash their refund checks.
In order to more carefully examine these impacts, we turn to multivariate analyses of these data.
Regression Results:  Determinants of EITC Usage
We use multivariate analyses to better understand how individual characteristics
influence the decision to use the EITC for either improving social mobility or making ends meet.
We use a logistic regression model to determine the odds of using the refund for either of these
use bundles.  Independent variables are defined in Appendix Table A-3.  Most of these are
straightforward and need little added explanation.  Single parents are those who file a return as a
head of household; welfare clients are those receiving either TANF or Food Stamps in 1997.  A
recipient has access to credit if she had either a checking account, savings account, credit card,
bank loan, or mortgage when she filled out her tax return as shown in Table 6.
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Table 7 summarizes the results from our logistic regression models.  We estimate the
probability that a recipient uses a portion of the refund for improving social mobility and the
probability that a recipient uses a portion of the refund for making ends meet two ways.  The first
three columns of each panel in Table 7 present the results from a model including all of the
independent variables, with dependent children entered as an interval variable.  The last three
columns contain the results for a model that incorporates dependent children as two dummy
variables—one for having exactly one dependent child and another for having two or more
children.  The second specification was designed to parallel the statutory treatment of family size
under the EITC.  For ease of interpretation, odds ratios are presented rather than coefficients.
Panel B of Table 7 explores the effects of individual characteristics and the size of the
EITC on the probability that a recipient would use some of the refund for improving social
mobility.  The results are nearly identical for both specifications.  In neither model do dependent
children have a significant effect on whether the recipient plans to use a portion of the refund for
improving social mobility.  Single parenting, being Hispanic/Latino, expecting a refund, and
having access to credit all significantly increase the likelihood of having a social mobility use for
the refund.  Single parents are about twice as likely as married parents to use some of the refund
for improving social mobility (2.5 and 1.93).  Hispanics/Latinos are 2.4 times more likely than
whites to have an improving social mobility use.  Recipients who expect their refund are more
than 2.2 times more likely to have a social mobility use for a portion of their refund than
recipients who do not expect the refund.  And having access to credit increases the likelihood
that a recipient will use the refund for improving social mobility by more than 1.8 times.
Women, on the other hand, are less likely (0.7 times less) than men to have a social mobility use.
In addition to the effect of these individual characteristics, the size of the EITC increases the
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probability of using the refund for an equity or social mobility purpose by 1.24 times for each
$1,000 in additional EITC benefits.
Only the expectation of a refund and the presence of dependent children significantly
influence the likelihood of a making ends meet use for a portion of the EITC (see Panel C of
Table 7).  Recipients who expect a refund are 2.0 times more likely to have a making ends meet
use for a portion of their refund than those recipients who do not expect a refund.  Dependent
children also increase the probability that a recipient will use some of the refund for making ends
meet.  The influence of the number of children may not be linear.  When entered as an interval
variable, the number of children increases the odds of having making ends meet plans for a
portion of the refund by 1.2 times for each additional child.  However, when the model is
specified to parallel the statutory parameters of the EITC, that is, with dummy variables for one
dependent child and for two or more dependent children, the results change a bit.  While the
coefficients for both variables are greater than one—suggesting an increase in odds—only the
coefficient on two or more dependent children is significant.  In other words, the presence of two
or more children significantly increases the odds of having a making ends meet use for a portion
of the EITC (1.5 times) while having only one child does not.
These results suggest that making ends meet is perhaps universal among EITC recipients
in that everyone more or less makes this use of the benefit, with family size the only significant
feature.  In contrast, improving social mobility seems to be more of a discretionary use of the
EITC in that many characteristics seem to influence this usage of the EITC, including access to
credit, size of refund, and single parent status.
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Summary and Conclusions:  Research and Policy Implications
This paper presents an initial exploration of the ways in which families use our largest
targeted income transfer program, the EITC.  The EITC is unique because of both its tax
administered nature and because of its “lumpiness” and once a year nature.  This lumpiness may
provide a key way to overcome a short-term liquidity crisis and to provide recipients with
opportunities to move beyond support of current consumption to meet more strategic longer term
goals.  The paper attempts to classify uses of the EITC according to making ends meet
(supporting consumption patterns) or improving social mobility (strategic uses that can be
expected to have longer term payoff).  We find strong support for both uses of the EITC.
In particular, we were surprised that more than one-half of EITC recipients use their
refunds to improve their social mobility.  Most EITC recipients are aware of the program and are
able to articulate several specific uses for their refund, including investments in higher current
and future earnings such as schooling, transportation, and moving.  While this should be seen as
a first cut at the data, nonetheless we believe that our findings have both important research and
policy implications.
Policy Implications
If we wish to encourage social mobility uses for the EITC, we find that they are positively
related to having formal contact with financial institutions.  As the federal government
increasingly moves toward electronic benefit transfer (EBT) over the next several years, both
formal relations with banks and the financial literacy that is required should be encouraged by
policymakers (Stegman 1998).  Opening a checking account offers a safe means of storing the
EITC until priority uses can be sorted out.  In turn, checking and savings accounts offer the
possibility for having both precautionary savings and for asset building.  Public policies that
24
permit or encourage asset accumulation for low-income households are obviously important here
and could further strengthen ties with formal financial institutions.
Viewed from a different perspective, public policy need not discourage financial accounts
either.  The recent literature finds evidence that social insurance in general, and means-tested
programs in particular, discourage savings (e.g., Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995; Gruber and
Yalowitz 1997; Powers 1998; Neumark and Powers 1998).  The fact that so few lower-income
clients have checking or savings accounts could be because the asset tests associated with welfare
receipt and/or Medicaid receipt discourage saving or opening bank accounts.  In most states the
EITC is not counted toward TANF for benefit determination; however, it is counted toward asset
limits after two months for Medicaid and SSI.  While many states have eased liquid asset tests
for TANF clients, Food Stamp asset limits for most families remain relatively low, thereby
penalizing savers who fear losing their jobs and having to reapply for aid.  Low limits on the
maximum value of a car ($5,000) in Food Stamps are liable to have similar effects on eligibility,
even when the literature clearly suggests that automobile ownership is a key positive determinant
of earnings levels.  However, while Food Stamp asset limits are relatively low, the EITC is
exempt from counting against Food Stamp asset limits for 12 months after receipt, a much longer
period than in the cases of SSI or Medicaid.  Understanding the negative effects of participation
in means-tested programs on savings and equity building deserves further investigation.  Still, ill
conceived policies to limit eligibility to clients whose automobiles are worth less than $5,000
should be re-evaluated in Food Stamps, while at the same time, Medicaid, SSI, and TANF might
mimic Food Stamps by exempting the EITC from  asset tests for 12 months instead of 2 months.
On a more practical note, legislation to create special subsidized savings accounts for
special purposes such as home ownership, post-secondary tuition, or retirement have recently
come upon the policy agenda (Boshara 1999).  Universal Savings Accounts (USAs) and
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Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are currently in the experimental stage.  If we believe
that asset accumulation is an important part of upward social mobility, only those with formal
ties to financial intermediaries will be able to take advantage of these efforts.  It may be useful
then to offer outright subsidies to EITC beneficiaries to open savings accounts for specified
purposes (e.g., Seidman 1998), thus providing an incentive to open a bank account and to save
for a specific goal.
Another important finding is that the number of dependent children affects usage of the
EITC for making ends meet.  Within our sample, 21 percent of families with children have three
or more children, and correspondingly larger needs for consumption.  Therefore, we should
consider expanding the EITC for families with three or four children, just as there is now a
difference between one and two children.  Several schemes for combining the EITC with
refundable personal tax credits could further condition the EITC benefit on family size (e.g.,
Cherry 1999) to help alleviate the higher current consumption needs of some EITC beneficiaries
and also to reduce the benefit reduction penalties in the phase-out region of the EITC.
The implications for tax policy are also important.  Increased effort need be made to
reduce the possibility of EITC fraud and abuse.  As Leibman (1998) suggests, self-declared
eligibility programs offer challenges to verification of eligibility.  As knowledge and use of the
EITC grow, so might gaming of the system.  The EITC and IRS also offer a device for other
types of social policy enforcement.  Our sample of call-backs found that in Illinois, both
uncollected child support and overdue student loans were sanctioned by the EITC in about 8
percent of all cases.  This method of enforcing social responsibility deserves additional research
and would increase the public’s understanding of the role and legitimacy of the EITC.  On the
other hand, tax policymakers might be more proactive in researching such topics as why so few
EITC clients make use of the advanced prepayment option.  While tax administered income
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support programs are in their infancy, there is a clear and obvious need for greater research and
exploration of both EITC compliance and use.
Research Implications
At this stage, we have just begun to explore our data and the effect of the EITC on family
finances and expenditures.  We have not yet fully investigated the data we have also collected on
assets and their effects on EITC usage.  For instance, we find that about a quarter of our sample
have credit cards and of these, 80 percent have credit card debt averaging about $2,400.  Yet only
18 percent of these respondents list paying off credit card debt as a priority use for the EITC
refund they receive.  Further, we plan to separately investigate those who received welfare over
the past year to learn of their knowledge of and use of the EITC benefits.  We also intend to
investigate the prior year benefit status of current EITC beneficiaries within our sample to see if
first time beneficiaries differ compared to repeaters.  Finally, we intend to “unbundle” our
groupings and investigate the determinants of each specific use, e.g., car repairs and purchases or
tuition payments.
Beyond our sample, we would encourage further research of this type in a dynamic
context.  Most families who receive the EITC is one year receive it in the next.  Indeed, more
than one-third of our sample stated that they received the EITC last year.19  Perhaps the EITC
plays an important part in assisting families to move from welfare to work to possibly middle
class status.  Of course, changes in unemployment, marriage and cohabitation, divorce or
separation, family living arrangements, and various other factors will also affect this transition.
Following a sample of recipients over time would shed additional light on these topics and more
clearly identify the pathways from dependency on means-tested transfers to economic
independence.
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Conclusions
The EITC helps meet current consumption needs and also offers avenues for upward
social mobility.  More than one-half of all beneficiaries had at least one mobility-related use for
the EITC, a high and significant number.  Such findings suggest that increased incentives for
savings, greater access to credit markets, and federal programs to match low-income savings for
specified purposes (e.g., home purchases or schooling) could lead to greater savings and work
effort by the low-income, low-wage population, and hence to greater levels of self-insurance and
self-sufficiency..
Finally, it is worth reiterating that the EITC is what makes these expenditures possible.
Given the overwhelming evidence that America is a low-wage nation, one should not be
surprised that the EITC could grow quickly into a $30 billion income support program.20  The
more that welfare to work succeeds, the more important will the EITC become for families who
make efforts to become self-sufficient.  The EITC clearly support TANF in this respect.  Our
evidence suggests that the EITC has become an integral part of American social policy.  It is used
to pay health care bills, pay tuition and provide transportation—all of which are more heavily
publicly subsidized in most other OECD nations.  Without the EITC, almost one-half could not
have met their first priority use for the EITC, while most of the rest could meet their need only to
a lesser extent or with some delay.21  Hence, the EITC provides an important source of support
for working poor families.  As such, the EITC appears to be our most effective federal program
for leading low-income families on a path toward true economic independence.  We hope that
our further research bears out this important initial finding.
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1. Food Stamps, TANF, and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) are all budgetarily smaller
programs in terms of expected costs for 1998.
2. The EITC is also available to single persons but at a much lower level.  In contrast to the
treatment of families with children, the level of EITC benefit for single filers has not
changed in real terms since 1994.
3. While higher benefits and word-of-mouth might have increased participation in the EITC
since 1990, other factors work in the opposite direction.  In 1991 the IRS began requiring
a new form, Schedule EIC, in order to claim EITC.  In 1990, the IRS would calculate and
issue the credit based on information in the form 1040.  The participation rate might
therefore have dropped somewhat in the early 1990s.  Our interviews showed that over 20
percent of EITC recipients were not expecting a refund.  Many of these individuals would
not have filed at all but for the CLHS tax program and others like it.  See O’Connor
(1999) for a more detailed analysis.
4. However, after two months, any savings from the EITC are counted toward liquid asset
tests in TANF, SSI, and Medicaid.  EITC does not count against Food Stamp asset limits
for 12 months (U.S. Congress 1998).  This point is discussed later in the paper.
5. Leibman (1998a) studies the issue of compliance to the EITC and focuses on
administrative issues.  He finds increased compliance with EITC rules and regulations
due to IRS rule changes and audits of returns in the 1990s.  We do not deal with these
topics below.
6. Ideally, one would like to separate the economic effects of the EITC using a
counterfactual group to parse out behavioral affects with a comparison group of some
type.  Because the EITC is a national program open to all low-income, low-wage
taxpayers, there is no natural control group.  One could examine year-to-year changes in
outlays using, for instance, the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).  However, the CEX
does not collect tax data and is not designed for assessing the effects of the EITC in
respondents.  Further, nonparticipants of the EITC are likely to be a nonrepresentative
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and biased group.  As a substitute, we devised the questions regarding ability to make
spending or saving decisions if the tax refund was not given.  These are reported on
below.
7. Romich and Weisner (1999) do not have access to tax returns but they estimate that 36 of
their 42 families are eligible for the EITC.  Some of their conclusions rely on anecdotes
from only a few of their families, but additional interviews are planned.  Our larger
sample (N=826) and direct knowledge of EITC receipt complement the analyses of
Romich and Weisner (1999) and Rimer (1995).  It is encouraging that our findings are
generally similar.
8. While we rely on the 826 questionnaires filled out at the time of the tax filing, the 208
call-back interviews provided verification of intended usage of these refunds.  Call-backs
were limited to those with refunds of $1,000 or more and we obtained a 50 percent
response rate.  About 90 percent of the call-backs received the refund amount calculated
by the CLHS.  Differences were due to federal inquiries regarding legitimacy of the
returns, or lower refunds due to school loans or child support payments that were
outstanding.  Among this 90 percent there was a high (85 percent) correspondence
between intended use of refund (sample used here) and actual usage (once the check
arrived), with no systematic change in the distribution of tax return usage by type of use.
Call-back interviewees were remarkably consistent in their preferences for EITC usage in
the phone interview compared to the face-to-face interview.
9. These can be compared to national totals for 1997 where 29 percent are married or joint
filers and 71 percent heads of households and single filers (U.S. Congress 1998,
Table 13-13, p. 871).  Our Chicago area sample likely contributed to the higher fraction
of head of household (or single) filers in our sample.
10. Edin (1998) reports that some of the men in her sample purchase trucks to use for
informal salvage operations for trash dumping (“junkers”) or for local moving, shipping,
and delivery services.
11. In fact, in other call-back interviews, we found a small number of EITC returns (less than
3 percent) which were reduced by the Internal Revenue Service because of money still
owed on guaranteed student loans.
12. Only in our call-back interview did we ask savers what they intended to do with the
savings.  Less than 30 percent said they were saving for expected future bills (a
consumption spending use), while more than 90 percent were saving for at least one of
the equity building purposes listed in Table A-2 (multiple responses were allowed).  All
forms of savings were classified as behavior that enhanced social mobility.
13. The large majority of the users’ bundles are noncontroversial.  Over 80 percent of the
responses in each grouping fell into the noncontroversial uses described above.
Alternative packaging of items such as durable purchases and paying off (or making)
informal loans to family members, did not affect the results.  Our future work will include
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unbundling of the major specific uses of the EITC into separate groupings with item-
specific descriptive regressions.
14. Due to overwithholding, the maximum amount of refund and use of refund can exceed
$3,656 in Panel A of Table 3.  Since Illinois does not have a state EITC, the federal
maximum of $3,656 is also the state maximum in Panel B.
15. Future classifications will include those receiving welfare the previous year compared to
all others, or those using check cashing services compared to all others, or those
expecting a refund compared to others.
16. CLHS tax preparers report that with each year of their growing caseload and given repeat
filers, knowledge of the EITC among tax claimants is increasing steadily.  See also
O’Connor (1999).
17. Most of those not responding to the priority question had a small and/or unanticipated
refund, which might have made the answer superfluous.
18. “Other uses” were not listed in Table 5.  They totaled 16.4 percent for improving social
mobility and 11.2 percent for making ends meet.
19. Eissa (1999) suggests that there is a similar level of EITC eligibility and use year-to-year
in the PSID.
20. The evidence of larger numbers of workers with low wages in the United States can be
found in Office of Economic Cooperative and Development (OECD 1996).  Currently
Australia, Germany, Denmark, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are
considering EITC type policies for low-wage workers.
21. And this ignores the 18.4 percent who did not respond to this question, more than a third
of whom had refunds in excess of $1,000.
Table 3.    Tax Refund and EITC among All Interviewees, Interviewees Getting
A Refund, and Interviewees Getting Both a Refund and EITC
(sample)
A.  Tax Refund
Overall
Interviewees
Getting a
Refund
Getting a Refund
and EITC
(sample)
Minimum $0 $1 $17
Average 1,326 1,450 1,795
Maximum 5,023 5,023 5,023
Percentiles
(by dollar amount of overall refund)
     10 29 163 265
     25 257 374 603
     50 772 927 1,715
     75 2,323 2,435 2,820
     90 3,279 3,358 3,584
N 1,226 1,121 826
B.  EITC
Overall Interviewees
Getting EITC
Getting a Refund
and EITC
(sample)
Minimum $0 $11 $11
Average 1,019 1,477 1,497
Maximum 3,656 3,656 3,656
Percentiles
(by dollar amount of overall refund)
     10 0 162 172
     25 0 332 349
     50 432 1,351 1,397
     75 2,011 2,210 2,210
     90 2,878 3,183 3,204
N 1,226 846 826
C.  EITC as Percent of Federal Tax Refund
Minimum 0.0 9.1 58.8
Average 59.0 85.5 87.2
Maximum 72.7 72.7 72.7
Percentiles
(by dollar amount of overall refund)
     10 0.0 40.1 44.8
     25 0.0 68.1 69.6
     50 70.3 87.4 87.9
     75 95.3 99.7 99.8
     90 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 1,226 846 826
Source:  Authors’ tabulation of the 1998 CLHS-EITC Survey.
Table 4.    Importance of EITC and Refund Expectation within EITC Range
I.  Importance of EITC
Percent of Respondents within EITC RangeIn Absence of Refund, Could
Respondent do First Priority Phase-In Plateau Phase-Out Overall
Yes 5.8 5.2 11.7 8.0
No 48.0 45.2 45.5 46.5
Less Amount 17.8 13.0 13.5 15.3
With Some Delay 25.7 35.7 27.4 28.1
Less Amount and Some Delay 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.5
Not Sure 2.4 0.9 1.1 1.6
Na 292 115 266 673
II.  Expect Refund
Yes 68.7 83.6 79.9 75.3
No 31.3 16.4 20.1 24.7
Total N 380 128 318 826
     aOver 18 percent of respondents did not answer this question (N=153)
Source:  Authors’ tabulations of 1998 CLHS-EITC Survey.
Table 5.    Important Uses of the Refund within EITC Range
Percent of Respondents within EITC Range
Panel Category Phase-In Plateau Phase-Out Overall
A Households receiving EITC 46.0 15.5 38.5 100.0
Any Improving Social Mobility Use 46.1 65.6 59.8 54.4
     Move 3.7 10.2 3.5 4.6
     Car/transportation 10.8 24.2 13.8 14.0
     Save 22.4 34.4 32.1 28.0
B
     Tuition/school 7.1 10.9 11.3 9.3
Any Making Ends Meet Use 50.8 46.1 45.9 48.2
     Utilities 32.9 37.5 31.1 32.9
     Rent 29.5 32.0 30.2 30.1
     Food 16.6 15.6 21.7 18.4
C
     Clothes 22.1 14.8 17.6 19.3
Plans for EITC
     None 24.2 10.2 17.6 19.5
     Improving social mobility only 25.0 43.8 36.5 32.3
     Making ends meet only 29.7 24.2 22.6 26.2
D
     Both 21.1 21.9 23.3 22.0
Total N 380 128 318 826
Source:  Authors’ tabulations of 1998 CLHS-EITC Survey.  Totals may not add due to rounding.
Table 6.    Access to Financial and Credit Markets by EITC Range
Percent of Respondents within EITC RangeAssets and Formal
Credit Phase-In Plateau Phase-Out Overall
A.  Percent with Different Forms
Checking account 24.0 36.7 49.7 35.8
Savings account 16.1 28.9 42.1 28.1
Credit card 16.6 27.4 37.7 26.4
Bank loan 1.8 2.3 5.0 3.2
Mortgage 3.7 2.3 10.1 5.9
Any of the above 40.0 59.4 72.6 55.6
B.  Percent Using a Check Cashing Service for Their EITC
57.8 44.3 34.2 44.3
Source:  Authors’ tabulations of 1998 CLHS-EITC Survey.
Table 7.    Determinants of EITC Usagea
Odds Ratio SE T
Odds
Ratio SE t
A.  Effects of Co-Variates on Respondent’s Decision to Use
Refund for Improving Social Mobility
Welfare 1.13 (0.21) 0.69 1.12 (0.20) 0.64
Single parent 2.15** (0.44) 3.73 1.93* (0.52) 2.43
Female 0.65* (0.13) -2.08 0.67* (0.14) -1.99
African-American 1.17 (0.27) 0.70 1.19 (0.27) 0.76
Hispanic/Latino 2.40** (0.61) 3.45 2.37** (0.60) 3.38
Other race 0.81 (0.25) -0.68 0.80 (0.25) -0.71
Expected refund 2.22** (0.41) 4.32 2.21** (0.41) 4.32
EIC97 (in 1,000s) 1.24* (0.11) 2.50 1.24* (0.11) 2.41
Access to credit 1.86** (0.31) 3.71 1.81** (0.30) 3.56
Phase-in range 0.79 (0.15) -1.26 0.79 (0.15) -1.22
Plateau range 1.06 (0.26) 0.25 1.03 (0.26) 0.13
Dependant kids 0.87 (0.07) -1.68
One dependent child 1.06 (0.32) 0.20
Two or more children 0.88 (0.13) -0.85
B.  Effects of Co-Variates on Respondent’s Decision to Use
Refund for Making Ends Meet
Welfare 1.12 (0.19) 0.67 1.10 (0.19) 0.56
Single parent 0.94 (0.18) -0.34 0.84 (0.22) -0.68
Female 1.09 (0.21) 0.45 1.13 (0.22) 0.64
African-American 1.00 (0.22) 0.00 0.99 (0.22) -0.03
Hispanic/Latino 0.66 (0.16) -1.74 0.63 (0.15) -1.91
Other race 1.05 (0.31) 0.17 1.04 (0.31) 0.12
Expected refund 2.02** (0.36) 3.94 2.02** (0.36) 3.94
EIC97 (in 1,000s) 1.02 (0.09) 0.26) 0.95 (0.08) -0.55
Access to credit 1.05 (0.17) 0.33 1.05 (0.17) 0.33
Phase-in range 1.19 (0.22) 0.97 1.18 (0.22) 0.91
Plateau range 0.92 (0.21) -0.35 1.01 (0.24) 0.05
Dependant kids 1.20* (0.09) 2.33
One dependent child 1.32 (0.39) 0.94
Two or more children 1.51** (0.22) 2.83
     aSee Table A-3 for variable definitions.
     *p < 0.05;    **p < 0.01.
Source:  Authors’ tabulations of 1998 CLHS-EITC Survey.
Source: Council of Economic Advisors (1998) Chart 3 for 1993; IRS Rev. Proc. 97-57 (1998) for 1999.
Figure 1. The Earned Income Tax Credit
for a Family with Two or More Children in 1993 and 1999
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Source: Authors' tabulations of 1998 CLHS-EITC Survey.
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Appendix Table A-1     Summary Demographic Data
(interview and sample)
All Interviewees Samplea
N Percent
Percent
(non-missing) N Percent
Percent
(non-missing)
A.  Ethnicity
African American 487 39.7 43.3 386 46.7 50.3
Hispanic/Latino 376 30.7 33.5 240 29.1 31.3
Caucasian 94 7.7 8.4 60 7.3 7.9
Asian/Pacific Islander 50 4.1 4.4 25 3.0 3.3
Native American 19 1.5 1.7 10 1.2 1.3
Other 98 8.0 8.7 47 5.7 6.1
Missing 102 8.3 -- 58 7.0 --
Total 1226 826
B.  Filing Status
Head of Household 559 45.6 45.9 518 62.7 62.7
Married/Joint 188 15.3 15.4 126 15.3 15.3
Married/Single 26 2.1 2.1 0 0.0 0.0
Single 443 36.1 36.4 182 22.0 22.0
Missing 10 0.8 -- 0 0.0 --
Total 1226 826
C.  Other Demographic Data
Male 482 39.3 39.5 262 31.7 31.9
Female 737 60.1 60.5 559 67.7 68.1
Missing 7 5 0.6 --
Total 1226 826
TANF receipt 232 18.9 217 26.3
Food Stamp receipt 279 22.8 251
Medicaid receipt 237 19.3 206
     aSample includes those receiving both the EITC and a net positive refund.
Source:  Authors’ tabulations of 1998 CLHS-EITC Survey.
Appendix Table A-2.    Components of Bundles
Improving Social Mobility
Savings
Pay off bank loan
Car payments
Credit card bills
Medical bills
Purchase or repair car
Share money with family members
Fix up home
Moving expenses
Tuition/school expenses
Child care bills
Pay off personal loans
Making Ends Meet
Rent
Utility bills
Other bills
Purchase groceries/pay grocery bills
Purchase clothing for self or family
Purchase household appliance
Purchase household furniture
Other personal or household expenses
Source: Authors’ tabulations of 1998
CLHS-EITC Survey
Appendix Table A-3
Independent Variable Definitions
Welfare participates in either Food Stamps or TANF
Single parent tax-filing status is “head of household”
Other race self-defined as any race other than African-American, Hispanic/Latino,
or White (omitted category)
EITC 97 (in 1000s) CLHS calculated EITC divided by 1,000
Access to credit prior to receiving the refund the recipient has at least one of:  checking
account, savings account, credit card, bank loan, or mortgage
Phase in range is in the phase-in range of the EITC (phase-out range is omitted)
Plateau range is in the phase-in range of the EITC (phase-out range is omitted)
Dependent kids number of dependent children
Values for Independent Variables
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Welfare 0.36 0.48 0 1
Medicaid 0.25 0.43 0 1
Single parent 0.58 0.49 0 1
Female 0.68 0.47 0 1
African American 0.47 0.50 0 1
Hispanic/Latino 0.29 0.45 0 1
Other race 0.10 0.30 0 1
Expected refund 0.75 0.43 0 1
EITC 97 (in 1000s) 1.50 1.12 0.01 3.66
Phasein 0.46 0.50 0 1
Plateau 0.15 0.36 0 1
Phaseout 0.38 0.49 0 1
Dependent kids 1.36 1.24 0 6
Access to credit 0.56 0.50 0 1
Source:  1998 CLHS-EITC Survey
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